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Abstract:
Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) located aboard ships emit radiation that may be
detectable in the undersea environment. An Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) could
be equipped with detection capabilities to determine whether commercial or private
vessels are carrying SNM prior to reaching port. Additional research is needed improve
such a UUV’s ability to detect and discriminate between types of SNM and reduce falsepositive detections. This research builds on past work by C. T. McKay to provide a higher
fidelity characterization of detectable radiation signatures from SNM in the undersea
environment with a focus on plutonium-bearing SNM.

252Cf

will be used to produce a

similar neutron energy distribution as plutonium. A carbon steel plate will simulate the
effect of vessel structural materials to produce representative neutron and capture
gamma radiation profiles. The transport of both neutron and capture gammas is
considered and compared. The neutron signature is reduced due to absorption in
seawater. However, neutron capture by seawater produces high-energy gammas. These
high-energy capture gammas are not attenuated as significantly as neutrons, have a
distinct energy profile, and may be readily detected at longer distances in seawater. A
Sodium Iodide detector and a High Purity Germanium detector will detect the gamma
population at set distances from the source and this signature will be compared with the
neutron signature detected with a Helium-3 detector. The results will provide insight into
preferable methods of detection and discrimination of capture gamma signatures to
identify SNM in the maritime environment.
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Introduction
Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is defined by Title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
as plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium235 [1], which can be used for nuclear weapons. When they decay they emit alphas,
betas, primarily lower energy gamma rays, and, in the case of plutonium, neutrons.
Knowing these decay mechanisms, the presence and type of these materials can be
assessed using neutron detection and/or gamma spectrometry.
Due to the threat posed by SNM and other illicit nuclear materials that could enter the
U.S., there are ongoing efforts to improve our ability to detect SNM at ports of entry and
the broader maritime domain. For example, the U.S. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s
Large Scale Detection Systems Program aims at improving scanning coverage using
radiation portal monitors at land border crossings and seaports [2].
Improvements in our ability to conduct real time scanning of vessels have included the
design of buoy-mounted sensors and the development of the SuperMISTI standoff
detection system [3]. The SuperMISTI system is capable of detecting, identifying, and
providing imaging for gamma sources at operationally practical distances [4]. Such
developments may offer a method of interrogating suspect vessels prior to entry in the
terminal without affecting the flow of commerce.
Neutrons present an interesting detectable signal in three respects: the natural
neutron background is generally low and predictable, neutron shielding methods are more
challenging than gamma shielding, and the ultimate free neutron end state is absorption,
which often results in the emission of very high-energy gammas, far beyond the energy
of the typical background gamma spectrum. These high-energy capture gammas also
have a lower probability of interacting with matter and consequently a longer mean free
path, making them harder to shield. Detection of neutron sources via capture gamma
signal has been proposed in both a border security context and in the undersea
environment [5,6]. Building on this previous undersea work, the intent of this project is to
further our understanding of the potential feasibility of both neutron and capture gamma
detection in an undersea environment.
Neutrons from plutonium-bearing SNM near the ship’s hull may escape the hull into
the seawater. Thermal neutrons will then be absorbed by surrounding materials, including
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hydrogen and chlorine in the water, and iron in the ship’s steel hull. These absorptions all
result in capture gamma emission, generally in the energy range from 2 to 8 MeV, with a
mean free path in water of 20-33 cm. According to the experiments conducted by McKay,
Schell, and Millett [6], seawater attenuation resulted in a detectable neutron signature out
to a distance of approximately 15 cm while the capture gamma signal was detectable out
to approximately 50 cm from the hull.
This project continues the previous work conducted by McKay that compared two
different SNM detection schemes that might be employed by an unmanned underwater
vehicle (UUV): (1) equipped with a neutron detector to directly detect neutrons from SNM
and (2) equipped with a gamma detector to detect capture gammas resulting from neutron
capture in seawater. There were three weaknesses identified in the previous study that
are improved upon. First, the source is located in air and the detector submerged in water
(as in the anticipated scenario), whereas the previous study had these reversed. Second,
the steel representative of hull material was placed between the water and the source,
whereas the previous study had no hull material. Lastly, the neutron source used in the
current study is a

252Cf

spontaneous fission source, with neutron energies similar to that

of 240Pu, whereas the previous study used an AmBe (𝛼,n) source. If a model with 252Cf is
validated, then further research would compare results from capture gammas produced
by 240Pu.
Experimental Setup, Simulations, and Analysis
This current study uses essentially the same sensors as the McKay experiment. A
high purity germanium detector (HPGe) and a 3He neutron detector, each of comparable
size, were used, though the sensors will be submerged in water. The experiment includes
a 252Cf spontaneous fission neutron source with an emission strength of approximately 3
x 106 neutrons per second. Note that this source strength is several times larger than the
neutron emission anticipated from a formula quantity [7] of weapons-grade plutonium.
Figure 1 indicates normalized neutron energy spectra from AmBe,

252Cf,

and

240Pu

neutron sources. This figure indicates that the californium spontaneous fission source is
a better representation of the plutonium neutron spectra than the previously used AmBe
source.
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The undersea environment was be simulated with a 55 gallon polyethylene drum filled
with artificial seawater, similar in mineral content to actual seawater but lacking biologics.
A ½-inch thick sheet of steel (0.5 percent carbon-steel) was placed between the source
and the water drum to simulate the hull of a vessel. Thermal neutrons interact with the
iron atoms in the steel and cause an increase in neutron capture and a change in gamma
radiation. Two models were created in the Monte Carlo Neutron Particle code (MCNP)
[8] to indicate the difference in the capture gamma signature based on the presence or
absence of a steel plate. An HPGe detector was modeled at a distance of 9 cm from the
hull, in the configuration indicated in Figure 2. The boxed region focuses on the energies
between 6-8 MeV where the additional capture gammas from iron are evident. The MCNP
model of the experimental configuration was then used to simulate the detector at various
distances from the vessel hull.

Figure 2. MCNP results of HPGe detected capture
gammas with (blue) and without (orange) a steel plate.

Figure 1. Normalized neutron energy spectra for 252Cf,
239
Pu, and AmBe.

The 252Cf source was mounted underneath the steel plate to simulate SNM in the bilge
area of a ship. Neutrons traveled into the steel and water by different paths and eventually
were absorbed, creating the measured capture gamma signature. The respective
detectors were submerged at various depths (representing distances from the hull) and
measured the gamma or neutron environment.
Results
Data was collected at three different depths with a 24-hour background sample and
five-minute tests as shown in Figure 3. The background and sample data were normalized
to show the significance of the surrogate SNM present by the signal of gamma rays from
neutron interaction and the source itself. Chlorine and Iron peaks were identified in the 6
to 8 MeV range due to the capture of the
4

252Cf

neutrons. There was no significant

background energy at the 6 and 8 MeV energy levels, making these excellent ranges for
material presence discrimination and aligned with the MCNP prediction. While capture
gammas were identified at energies greater than 8 MeV, they appear to be less useful in
SNM discrimination due to their weaker peak.

Figure 3. This particular collection of data was at 20
cm. The highlighted region identifies the SNM.

Figure 4. The Signal to Noise Ratio between neutron
(orange) and gamma (blue) detection.

The results of these simulations and experiments provide a better characterization of
the combined undersea neutron and capture gamma signatures anticipated from a
plutonium-bearing SNM source located within a steel hull. Similar to previous work, a
crossover point was found, where, at some distance from the hull, the capture gamma
signature became more observable than the neutron signature. The gamma detection
can also track more than just the parent reaction gammas, but also the decay of daughter
products and their levels of energy, making discrimination of SNM by gamma
spectrometry more effective.
Figure 4 concludes that the gamma detection has almost four times the signal to noise
ratio at 20 cm than the neutron detection from the source. This suggests capture gamma
detection represents a more capable method of SNM detection in the undersea
environment.
This improved characterization will be useful in the development of protocols and the
design of detection systems for use on UUVs, including both determination of detector
type and the identification of energy regions of interest. Finally, having a validated model
of this near-hull undersea environment will support further studies for system optimization
or signal exploitation without the need for full experimentation.
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